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WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC REGULATION OF
AIR TRANSPORT I*
A. J. THOMAS, JR.t
I. INTRODUCTION
At the outset it may be stated that there is no international
regulation of scheduled air transport in the economic realm
comparable to those economic principles incorporated in the
Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938 which are applicable to American
air transport companies as well as to foreign airlines flying
to the United States. There are no uniform international
economic controls regulating the number of international air
transport companies flying the world air routes designed to
forestall the establishment of unwarranted air service and
duplication of routes, thus preventing cutthroat competition.
International rules requiring the fixing of reasonable rates
to eliminate ruinous rate wars by international carriers are
nonexistent. International controls to prohibit those close
combinations or interrelationships of the airlines companies
which lead to consolidations of economic power resulting in
monopoly have not been authorized, and, furthermore, there
is nothing to prevent the nations themselves from fostering
combinations which would result in international air cartels. No
international body has been created with powers similar to
the United States Civil Aeronautics Board to license inter-
national air services, prescribe routes, fix rates, and regulate
unfair competitive practices in order to eliminate wasteful
competition, uneconomic rates and subsidies, and monopolies.
It is not meant to convey the impression that international
air transport flies unregulated. The nations unilaterally regu-
late in the economic field the operations of those airlines
touching their territory. Such control is exemplified by the
regulatory provisions authorized by the United States Civil
Aeronautics Act which not only co-ordinates American car-
riers operating abroad, but also promulgates economic controls
*This article is a portion of a thesis prepared to fulfill the requirement
for an S.J.D. Degree from the University of Michigan Law School. The
second part will appear in the Fall Issue of this Quarterly.
tAssistant Professor of Law, Southern Methodist University.
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for foreign air carriers operating to the United States, its
territories and possessions. Moreover, certain regulations of
an economic nature have been embodied in air transport agree-
ments entered into by two nations affecting the air carriers
of each nation flying to the other. These are called bilateral
agreements. But neither unilateral action nor bilateral action
of nations necessarily establish rules of international law.
There has been no general multilateral agreement assented to
by the members of the community of nations which would
create a body of international law formulating international
economic control of world air transport.
A basic principle of international law has had far-reaching
implications of paramount economic importance to international
air transport. The concept of sovereignty permits each nation
to excerise exclusive jurisdiction within its own territory and
thereby control the transit and landing of foreign air trans-
port within its boundaries. Before an airline of one state may
operate over and into the territory of another, the latter
must assent thereto either by multilateral or bilateral treaty
or by a direct agreement with a particular airline company of
a foreign state. Therefore, sovereignty, a legal principle,
restricts and impedes the development of world air transport.
The establishment of world air routes and operations are
subjected to the whim of each nation over and through which
the route passes.
II. SOVEREIGNTY OF THE AIR
The concept of sovereignty of nations and the reasons for
its being have tended to frustrate world cooperative endeavor
in all international spheres-political, economic and social-and
in the field of world air transport its effects have created a
specialized problem. It is a fundamentM1 principle of interna-
tional law that each state is possessed of supreme sovereignty
over its national domain, and national domain is defined to
include land, territorial waters and superjacent airspace., Each
1. The following statements are set forth in 1 OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL
LAw (7th ed. 1948):
State territory is that definite portion of the surface of the globe which
is subjected to the sovereignty of the State. § 169, p. 407.
The importance of State territory lies in the fact that it is the space
within which the State exercises its supreme authority. § 170, p. 408.
The territory of a State consists in the first place of the land within
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1950/iss3/2
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nation therefore has complete and exclusive control over the
airspace above its territory. Due to this immutable, though
debatable, rule of the law of nations, each nation of the world
may admit or exclude foreign air transport as it, in its dis-
cretion, sees fit. Each state not only controls the right for air
carriers to land and the right to trade within its borders, but
in controlling the air column above it, a state may effectively
prevent the establishment of a world air route through its
airspace.
Prior to the first World War there was heated dispute with
respect to the juridical nature of the airspace.2 Legal authori-
ties were in accord upon one point alone, namely, that the
airspace over the sea and over unoccupied territory is com-
pletely free.3 But with reference to the superjacent airspace
of states there was hopeless disagreement. Experts of inter-
national law advanced the foll6wing theories on the subject
of airspace over occupied land and territorial waters of states:
(1). On an analogy to the doctrine of freedom of the seas, the
airspace was said to be entirely free.
(2). On an analogy of the relation between the maritime belt
and the open sea, a theory was put forward that the territorial
state has sovereign rights in a lower zone of the airspace, but
a higher zone is free and ownerless.
(3). The airspace above the state is within the jurisdiction of
that state's xercise of sovereignty as a part of its territory,
but that such sovereignty is subject to a servitude of innocent
passage for foreign civil aircraft, but not foreign military air-
craft.
(4). Applying the private law theory of cujus est solum ejus
est usque ad coelum et ad infernos, it was rationalized that the
its boundaries. To this~must be added, in the case of a State with a
sea coast, certain waters which are within or adjacent to its land
boundaries, and these waters are of two kinds--national and territorial.§ 172, p. 415.
The practice of States seems to accord with the theory of the sov-
eignty of the subjacent State in the air space above its territory and
waters, both national and territorial.... § 197e, p. 475.
See also STARKE, AN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAw 100-123
(1947); ZOLLmAN, LAW OF THE AiR 3 (1927).
2. 1 OPPENHEIm, op. cit. stpra note 1, § 197a; COLEGROVE, INTERNATIONAL
CONTROL OF AVIATION 40-52 (Stud. ed. 1930); ToMBs, INTERNATIONAL OR-
GANIZATION IN EUROPEAN Ai TRANSPORT 4-5 (1936); Kuhn, The Beginning
of an Aerial Law, 4 Am. J. INT'L. LAW 109 (1910).
3. 1 OPPENHEIM, op. cit. supra note 1, § 197a.
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state was possessed of complete and absolute sovereignty to an
unlimited height over the airspace above its territory.'
With the advent of the war in 1914 the argument was
ended because air and land frontiers were closed for security
reasons and the principle of sole and absolute sovereignty and
ownership of the airspace by the subjacent state emerged
triumphant, accepted by contesting states and neutrals alike.'
At the war's end an Aeronautical Commission of the Peace
Conference was set up to study problems of air control and
to draft an air navigation convention. The United States, an
active member of the Commission, failed to ratify the Con-
vention which followed, although many of the Allied Powers
and some neutrals adhered thereto.6 The Convention Relating
to the Regulation of Aerial Navigation 1919 of Paris was of
tremendous importance since it formulated uniform interna-
tional rules for air navigation. 7 The Convention also admitted
the validity of the theory of sovereignty in airspace by Article
1, wherein it was stated:
The high contracting parties recognize that every power
has complete and exclusive sovereignty over the air space
above its territory.8
4. Ibid.; SHAWCROSS AND BEAUMONT, AIR LAw, 85; ZOLLMAN, op. Cit.
supra note 1, 1-4; English, Air Freedom: The Second Battle of the Books, 2
J. AIR L. 356 (1931).
5. ZOLLMAN, op. cit. supra note 1, at 3:
At the outbreak of the war all air frontiers closed with a Janus-like
clang. Physical safety, military necessity, and sanitary convenience
forced belligerents and non-belligerents alike to take the position that
each state has exclusive dominion over the airspace above its territory.
6. Thirty-three nations adhered to the Paris Convention. They were:
Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Czechoslovakia, Denmark,
Estonia, Finland, France, Great Britain, Greece, India, Iraq, Ireland, Italy,
Japan, Latvia, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Paraguay, Peru, Poland,
Portugal, Roumania, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, Uruguay, Union
of South Africa, Yugoslavia. Rhyne, Legal Rules for International Aviation,
31 VA. L. REv. 267, 271 n. 14 (1945).
7. THE CONVENTION FOR THE REGULATION OF AERIAL NAVIGATION: Paris
1919, No. 2143 (U.S. Dep't State 1944). In addition to its recognition of
airspace sovereignty the Convention set forth principles with respect to
the nationality of aircraft, admission to air navigation above foreign terri-
tory, rules as to air worthiness of aircraft, certification and licensing of pi-
lots and measures to insure safety of peoples of underlying nations. More-
over, the International Commission for Air Navigation was created to ad-
minister. the Convention. For discussions pertaining to this Convention see
Bouve, Regulation of International Air Navigation under the Paris Con-
vention, 6 J. AIR L. 299 (1935) ; Rhyne, supra note 6, at 270; COLGROVE, op.
cit. supra note 2, at Chapter IV, 53-65.
8. Article 1 further stated: "... the territory of a state shall be under-
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1950/iss3/2
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Two later international conventions, the Ibero-American at
Madrid in 19269 and the Pan-American Convention of Com-
mercial Aviation at Havana in 1928,1 also accepted the sover-
eignty principle"l and this concept remained unimpaired as
the rule of international air law during the time elapsing
between the two World Wars.
The International Civil Aviation Conference of 194412 held
at Chicago was heralded with great fanfare; its purpose: to
stood as including the national territory, both that of the mother country and
of the colonies, and the territorial waters adjacent thereto."
9. This agreement is set out in 8 J. Am L. 3 (1937). This Convention
had little effect and became inactive prior to the Chicago Convention. See
Rhyne, supra, note 6, at 273; TO iBs, op. cit. supra note 2, at 50-52, COLE-
GROVE, op cit. supra note 2, at 88-90.
10. 4 TREATIES, CONVENTIONS, INTERNATIONAL ACTS, PROTOCOLS AND
AGREESMENTS 4729 (1938). Costa Rica, Chile, Ecuador, the United States,
Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Dominican Re-
public. See TOMBS, op. cit. supra note 2, at 50-51; COLGROVE, Op. Cit. SUpra
note 2, at 88-94; Rhyne, supra note 6, at 274; Warner, The International
Convention for Air Navigation and the Pan American Convention for Air
Navigation: A Comparative and Critical Analysis, 3 Am L. REv. 221 (1932) ;
Latchford, Habana Convention on Commercial Aviation, 2 J. AIR L. 207(1931).
11. Article 1 of the Ibero-American Convention states:
The High Contracting Parties recognize that each possesses the com-
plete and exclusive sovereignty of the air space corresponding to its
territory.
Article 1 of the Pan American Convention states:
The high contracting parties recognize that every state has complete
and exclusive sovereignty over the air space above its territory and
territorial waters.
12. CONFERENCE SERIES No. 2282 at 64 (U.S. Dep't State 1945). Some 54
nations were represented at the Chicago Conference. Some 51 nations have
adhered to the Convention as of April, 1949. Five documents were drawn
up at the Conference to be signed. 1. The Final Act-a document listing
the representatives present, the matters that the conference did not con-
sider or upon which agreement could not be reached, and a recommended
standard form agreement to be used by nations negotiating bilaterally for
air routes. 2. The Interim Agreement on International Civil Avi tion-
this agreement was to be effective until the permanent Convention became
effective, which would be thirty days after twenty-sLx nations had formally
ratified or adhered. A provisional international organization of a technical
and advisory nature was set up to cobrdinate and guide international avia-
tion until the permanent Convention became effective. 3. The Convention of
International Civil Aviation-Broadly this document set forth the theory
of sovereignty, set out provisions as to flight over territory of contracting
states, provided rules for the nationality of aircraft, measures to facilitate
nagivation, required certificates of airworthiness and licensing of airmen,
called for uniform technical standards, created the International Civil Avia-tion Organization, required the denunciation of other Conventions and theabrogation of inconsistent agreements, required the registration of aero-
nautical agreements and provided for disagreements and disputes. 4. TheInternational Air Tr sit Agre ment. 5. The Intern tional Ai i Tansport
Agreement.
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open the sky, to gain some measure of airspace freedom.13
During World War II world air transport came into its own
and, with the technical developments of the war years, proved
that global flight was a reality, a necessity, and a practicality.
Thus international air transport found itself poised on the
threshold of a brilliant future only to be halted by the stum-
bling block of airspace sovereignty. In order to overcome this
impediment, the conference was called at Chicago to conclude
world-wide agreement concerning commercial air rights and
to set forth rules governing international technical and navi-
gational matters. In spite of its practical raison d'etre not a
dent was made in the old concept of sovereignty, and in the
following words the doctrine was once again affirmed and
placed before the world:
The contracting States recognize that every State has
complete and exclusive sovereignty over the air space
above its territory.4
Since international conventions establish rules of inter-
national law as well as delineate international custom, and
since there is unquestionably a concerted attitude evidenced
by the nations through international conventions and practices,
it may be safely asserted that the principle of airspace sover-
eignty is an established corner-stone of international law. 5
III. FREEDOM OF THE AIR
Freedom of the air insofar as air commerce is concerned,
and in its widest sense, can be said to include the privilege
to fly over the high seas; the privilege to fly across the ter-
ritory of a foreign state; the privilege to land; and the privi-
lege to trade, that is, to put down traffic in a foreign state
taken on in an air carrier's state of origin, to take on traffic
in a foreign state destined for an air carrier's state of origin,
to take on traffic in a foreign state destined for any other
foreign state, to discharge traffic in a foreign state coming
from any other foreign state, and to carry traffic between two
points within the same foreign state.
13. See Invitation of the United States of America to the Conference
and Message from President Roosevelt as set out in Dept. of State Publica-
tion 2282, Conference Series 64 (1945) ; Bowen, The Chicago International
Civil Aviation Conference, 13 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 308 (1945).
14. Article 1, CONVENTION ON INTERNATIONAL CIVIL AVIATION.
15. OPPENHEIM, op. cit. supra note 1 § 197e; see §§ 16, 17, 18, 19 with
respect to the sources of international law.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1950/iss3/2
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In the absence of treaty, international customary law is
applicable, and since, as has been shown, international custom-
ary law as well as multilateral treaties recognize only the
concept of complete sovereignty of a state over its superjacent
airspace, the sole freedom of which air commerce may now
boast is that freedom to fly in the airspace above the high
seas. The airspace over the territory and territorial waters
is subjected to absolute, xclusive jurisdiction of each nation
restricted by no right of innocent passage. The rights of
transit, landing and trading are subservient to the consent of
each sovereign state and to obtain such consent is often a
matter of difficult and devious bargaining, states being un-
willing to accommodate each other without each exacting its
pound of flesh and making the best possible bargain for itself.
With heavy and restrictive principles hampering world air
transport, it is obvious that some opening of the sky was
necessary or air commerce was stymied from the beginning.
Thus the representatives of nations have assembled at various
times in international conferences attempting to solve the
problem. It is disheartening to note that as yet they have
made little progress.
The first notable conference concerning itself with free-
doms of the air was that called in Paris, from which sprang
the Convention Relating to the R~gulation of Aerial Naviga-
tion.16 A provision was inserted in this document to the effect
that each contracting state undertook to accord in time of
peace, freedom of innocent passage above its territory to the
aircraft of the contracting states.17 This freedom of innocent
passage was granted not as a matter of natural right but as a
mere privilege to the aircraft of other states provided certain
conditions were observed.18  Furthermore, the provision was
not applicable to foreign international scheduled air transport
nor to the establishment of international airways, for it was
qualified and limited by Article 15 of the Convention. Though
this article bearing upon navigation stated in paragraph one
16. See note 7 supra.
17. Article 2 reads: "Each contracting state undertakes in time of peace
to accord freedom of innocent passage above its territory to the aircraft
of the other contracting states, provided that the conditions laid down in
the present convention are observed."
18. TOMBS, op. cit. supra note 2, at 53.
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that "every aircraft of a contracting state has the right to cross
the airspace of another state without landing," yet the third
paragraph of the same article, somewhat unintelligibly in view
of the quoted passage, declared that "the establishment of
international airways shall be subject to the consent of the
state flown over." There was a great deal of academic dis-
cussion as to the meaning of these paragraphs, some authori-
ties advancing the theory that the freedom of innocent passage
article and the right to cross the airspace of another state
without landing gave the right of establishing and operating
international airlines and airways. Nonetheless in practice the
contrary was true for any right or privilege of innocent passage
was confined to private aircraft and the consent of the state,
as indicated by the third paragraph of Article 15, was inevitably
necessary for an establishment of international airways over
that state's territory." Moreover, any conflicts of opinion as to
the interpretation of these articles were completely dispelled at
an extraordinary session of the International Commission for
Air Navigation of 1929, where it was most clearly stated:
Every contracting state may make conditional on its prior
authorization the establishment of international airways
and the creation and operation of regular international air
navigation lines, with or without landing, on its territory.2
This provision subjected regular commercial air transport
services to the will of each and every nation, permitting each
nation to determine unilaterally whether or not world air-
ways and international airlines might cross its territory.
The Paris Convention also established rules for trade, that
is, the picking up and discharging of passengers and cargo.
Article 16 reads:
Each contracting state shall have the right to establish
reservations and restrictions in favor of its national air-
craft in connection with the carriage of persons and goods
for hire between two points on its territory.
This section relates to air cabotage. Cabotage may be de-
fined as the carriage of persons and goods between two points
of a state's territory. In maritime law, cabotage is inclusive
of trade only along the coast line of a nation"' but in its
19. Id. at 61-62; LiSSiTZYN, INTERNATIONAL AIR TRANSPORT AND NA-
TIONAL PoLIcy, 366-370 (1942).
20. TOMBS, op. cit. supra note 2, at 60.
21. OPnNHEIM, op. cit. supra note 1, § 187.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1950/iss3/2
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relation to air transport the cabotage concept becomes broader.
As stated above, a state was permitted to restrict carriage
between two points on its territory in favor of its own aircraft.
Territory was then defined as the mother country, colonies,
territorial waters adjacent thereto, and the territories of pro-
tectorates.Y For example, cabotage was applicable not only
between points of the mother country but also between the
mother country and colonies as well. 3
The Ibero-American Convention (Madrid) also adopted the
principles of the Paris Convention as to the so-called freedom
of the air, making international air services subject to the
consent of the nation flown over.24 However, the later Pan-
American Convention was, insofar as the language used, less
restrictive when compared to the previous conventions. The
Havana Convention by its terms indicated a relaxing of the
rule requiring the necessity of each nation's consent. Article
21 of the latter Convention declared:
The aircraft of a contracting state engaged in interna-
tional air commerce shall be permitted to discharge passen-
gers and a part of its cargo at one of the airports desig-
nated as a port of entry of any other contracting state,
and to proceed to any other airport or airports in such
state for the purpose of discharging the remaining pas-
sengers and portions of such cargo and in like manner to
take on passengers and load cargo destined for a foreign
state or states, provided that they comply with the legal
requirements of the country over which they fly, which
legal requirements shall be the same for native and foreign
aircraft engaged in international traffic and shall be com-
municated in due course to the contracting states and to
the Pan-American Union.
Although this article appeared to make consent unnecessary,
nevertheless its meaning was unclear and practically speaking
authorization was always obtained by an airline beginning
operations to another country, even though the airline pos-
sessed the nationality of a contracting nation and was operating
to another contracting nation.25
The cabotage provision was similar to that of the Paris
22. Paris Convention, supra note 7, art. 1 and art. 40.
23. TOMBs, op. cit. supra note 2, at 69.
24. See note 9 supra.
25. LissiTzyis, op. cit. supra note 19, at 370-373, Rhyne, supra note 6, at
275. Rhyne gives a short comparison of the three Conventions at 270-273.
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Convention, permitting restrictions in favor of a state's own
carriers as to commercial transportation of passengers and
cargo between two or more points in its territory.28
It can be discerned that the nations prior to World War H
seemed content to impede world air transport. Since no right
to establish airways over a nation or operate airlines over or
to a nation existed without consent of that nation, bargaining
by bilateral agreement was the order of the day; and states
were quick to seize upon this weakness of international law to
better their positions by limiting severely in many instances,
or refusing outright to grant any privileges of transit in
others.27
The issue in its entirety was once again brought to world
attention at the Chicago Conference. Once again the right
of each state to control the transit of scheduled international
transport was acknowledged to be within the exclusive juris-
diction of the sovereign state.
No scheduled international air service may be operated
over or into the territory of a contracting State, except
with the special permission or other authorization of the
State, and in accordance with the terms of such permis-
sion or authorization.2 9
Not only was the complete sovereignty of the air principle
reasserted by the Chicago Convention, but it also affirmed the
old entrenched doctrine of individual nation control of the air
routes and air operations in the strongest possible language.
26. Pan American Convention, supra note 10, art. 22.
27. See Berle, Freedoms of the Air, Blueprint for World Civil Aviation,
Conference Series No. 2348 at 70 (U.S. Dep't State 1945). Berle here gives
a clear statement of air privileges which the United States and United
States carriers had obtained from other nations prior to 1944. See pp. 7-8.
28. For articles discussing the Chicago Conference and Convention see
Berle, Freedoms of the Air; Morgan, The International Civil Aviation Con-
ference at Chicago: What it Means to the Americas; Burden, Opening the
Sky: American Proposals at Chicago; Warner, The Chicago Air Conference:
Accomplishments and Unfinished Business. These articles are all contained
in Blueprint for World Civil Aviation, op. cit. supra note 27. Also see
Osterhout, A Review of the Recent Chicago International Air Conference, 31
VA. L. REv. 376 (1945) ; Rhyne, supra note 6; Bowen, supra note 13.
29. The Chicago Convention, supra note 12, art. 6. Art. 5 granted non-
scheduled services the right of non-stop flight across nations and the right
to land for non-traffic purposes without prior authorization. Non-scheduled
air carriers were permitted the right to trade also subject to art. 7. Art. 7
permitted each contracting state to reserve cabotage rights.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1950/iss3/2
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Since the contracting nations could not agree to grant multi-
laterally rights of transit and traffic rights for international
air services, two separate and optional agreements were pro-
mulgated and offered for signature. It was hoped by these
agreements to. bring about some multilateral exchange of
operating rights. They were called the International Air
Service Transit Agreement (the two freedoms agreement) and
the International Air Transport Agreement (the five freedoms
agreement) ° As mentioned, their purpose was to grant free-
dom of commercial transit and traffic rights to scheduled air
transport.
The two freedoms agreement provided that each contracting
state would grant to another contracting state:
(1). The privilege to fly across its territory without land-
ing;
(2). The privilege to land for non-traffic purposes (reful-
ing and repairs)."
In addition it was stipulated that a contracting state could
designate the route to be followed and the airports to be used
within its territory by international airlines. 2 An air carrier
of another nation to which the privilege of non-traffic stops
has been granted may be required to provide commercial air-
line service from those stops. 3
The five freedoms agreement reiterated numbers 1 and 2 of
the Air Transit Agreement. The other freedoms granted
were:
(3). The privilege to put down passengers, mail and cargo
taken on in the territory of the State whose nation-
ality the aircraft possesses.
(4). The privilege to take on passengers, mail and cargo
destined for the territory' of the State whose nation-
ality the aircraft possesses.
(5). The privilege to take on passengers, mail and cargo
destined for the territory of any other contracting
State and the privilege to put down passengers, mail
and cargo coming from any such territory.3 4
The Air Transport Agreement requires air carriers to follow
reasonably direct routes out of and back to the homeland of
30. Id., Apendix III, p. 87 and Appendix IV, p. 91.
31. Air Transit Agreement, id., art. 1, § 1.
32. Id., § 4(1).
33. Id., § 3.
34. Air Transport Agreement, id., art. 1, § 1.
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the state whose nationality the airline possesses,35 and, as in
the Air Transit Agreement, a contracting state may require
an air carrier stopping for non-traffic purposes to offer reason-
able commercial services at the points at which such stops are
made. 1 Routes and airports within a state may be designated
by that state. 7 As to through traffic (fifth-freedom traffic)
consideration must be given to the interests of other con-
tracting states so as not to interfere in a prejudicial manner
with their regional services or the development of their
through services." Contracting states may refuse to accord
the fifth-freedom privilege if they so desire.39 Cabotage rights
are reserved to each contracting nation.40  However, no eco-
nomic regulation of rates, unfair practices, limitation of
routes, schedules or operating capacity is designated.
These five freedoms have been analyzed as follows:
1. Freedom for peaceful commercial aircraft to fly
through the air of another country. This would mean
that an American plane, for example, could travel freely
over England, although it might be required to follow
certain lanes for reasons of safety or military security.
British planes, of course, would have similar rights of
flight over the United States.
2. Freedom for such aircraft to land in other countries
at agreed ports solely for the purpose of refuelling and
overhaul, but not to take on or discharge commerce. In
other words, an American plane bound for Paris might
land at the great British air base near Prestwick, Scot-
land, for gasoline and repairs; but it could not leave
passengers and freight there, nor could it pick up in
Prestwick passengers who wanted to go on to Paris.
3. Freedom to carry traffic from the plane's country of
origin to any other country. This simply would mean
that a Pan-American or American Export Lines plane
could fly passengers and freight from any United States
airport to designated ports in all other countries.
4. Freedom to pick up in other countries traffic destined
for the plane's homeland. Under this freedom, an Ameri-
can plane returning from Paris to New York could accept
passengers bound for the United States only at Le Bourget
field and Prestwick or any other base it might touch on
35. Ibid.
36. Id., § 3.
37. Id., § 5 (1).
38. Id., art 3.
39. Id., art. 4, § 1.
40. Id., art. 1, § 4.
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the homeward journey. But it could not (unless the fifth
freedom were agreed upon) carry a passenger who wanted
to go only from Paris to Prestwick.
5. Freedom for a foreign plane to carry traffic between
countries outside its own. Thus, the American plane home-
ward bound from Paris could take on and drop off pas-
sengers and cargo moving between Paris and Prestwick,
or between any other two countries along its route.4
At the Chicago Conference Canada suggested that a multi-
lateral agreement should be signed containing only the first
four freedoms,2 and the real dispute came over whether the
fifth-freedom privilege should be granted. The United States
delegation felt it would be most serious and disadvantageous
to long distance trunk-lines to omit the fifth-freedom privilege,
that is, the privilege of intermediate or pick-up traffic. To
omit this latter privilege would mean that,
[a]n airline operating a long route under this Canadian
formula would fly with a constantly growing number of
empty seats. For example, a plane from New York to
Cairo via London, Paris, Geneva, and Rome would drop
off at each city the passengers booked to that point and
take on none, thus probably arriving at Cairo with per-
haps two or three seats occupied. Between New York and
Buenos Aires, for instance, only 15 per cent of the traffic
is through traffic, and therefore we should be able to
operate only about one plane a week on that trade route
* . . through lines could not live or develop on terminal
traffic alone as provided under the Canadian formula.43
The Air Transit or two freedoms agreement then grants the
privilege of flight or transit, and thus seeks to prevent an indi-
vidual state from prohibiting the establishment of world airways
or trade routes across its territory. The five freedoms docu-
ment not only grants the right of transit but also the right to
trade, that is, an international airline would be enabled to
operate along an international direct route from its home nation
picking up cargo, passengers and mail and discharging the
same at nations along the route. The five freedoms agree-
ment if accepted multilaterally on an extensive scale would
eliminate the legal obstacle placed in the path of transit and
operational privileges of international air services.
41. Berle, supra note 27, at 6.
42. Morgan, supra note 28, at 12.
43. Id. at 12-13.
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What can be said to be the status of transit and trade rights
since the Chicago Conference, and the adoption of the Con-
vention? Surprisingly, the legal position is essentially the
same. The Transit Agreement has been accepted rather widely
by the nations adhering to the Convention, but it has not been
accepted by many nations which lie across some of the world's
air trade routes.44 Furthermore, the Transit Agreement may
be terminated by any contracting nation upon the giving of
one year's notice.45 Since this is true the agreement can
hardly be considered to possess a sufficiently enduring quality
on which to rest a system of permanent air routes.
The five freedoms agreement has been ratified by only
a small number of nations. 4, The United States adhered to
this document, but has since renounced it. 4 As acceptance has
been so meager and as it, too, may be terminated by the giving
of a year's notice,4 8 it cannot be said to be of importance to
international air services at this time.
Hence the legal position of scheduled international air serv-
ices is still comparable to that existing prior to the Conference.
Except for the time when a nation is bound by the Air Transit
Agreement, the Air Transport Agreement or some bilateral
agreement, it is free to choose and bargain as it sees fit, taking
every advantage of its geographical and political position to
exclude or permit commercial air service transit and trade
through and within its territory.
This assent by the community of nations to restrict air com-
merce seems to be contrary to the freedom of the seas which
Grotius proclaimed and fostered in the 17th century,49 and it
is often said that commercial air transport should be entitled
to identical rights or freedoms possessed by ocean shipping.
Freedom of the seas simply means that by rule of international
law there is a right to navigate on the high seas. No state
possesses sovereignty over the high seas; therefore, the ships
of every nation enjoy the right to navigate upon the high seas
44. As of today, for example, the U.S.S.R. with wide and expansive ter-
ritory is not a party to the Air Transit Agreement.
45. Air Transit Agreement, supra note 30, art. 3.
46. As of 1948 some seventeen nations had signed this Agreement.
47. The United States signed but withdrew when it ratified the Con-
vention.
48. Air Transport Agreement, supra note 30, art. 5.
49. GROTIus, THE FREEoM OF TH SE s (Magoffin's trans. 1916).
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free from interference by other nations."0 Air transport also
possesses this same freedom; that is, there is absolute freedom
to navigate through the airspace above the high seas. By
rule of international law each state possesses sovereignty over
its territorial waters; still, this sovereignty is limited by a
right of innocent passage. Thus, a vessel may pass through a
foreign state's territorial waters without obtaining the permis-
sion of that state.51 Air transport has not been accorded this
privilege. No such right of innocent passage exists in the air-
space above the territorial waters of a state insofar as com-
mercial air transport is concerned; consequently, when a foreign
commercial aircraft passes through the airspace above terri-
torial waters it must obtain authorization from the subjacent
state. Moreover, license is generally given ocean shipping
to enter and trade in foreign ports. Although each nation
is possessed of sovereignty over its ports and may open or
close its ports, in the absence of treaty, as it desires, neverthe-
less, in practice and by international custom or treaty each
nation extends to shipping the privilege to enter its ports for
purposes of refuelling or to discharge and pickup cargo. 2
Again air transport does not possess this privilege.5 3 The free-
dom granted to ocean shipping would appear to be a distinctive
characteristic of that form of communication, accorded largely
as a matter of tradition. Acceptance of the Air Transport
Agreement would give essentially the same rights to air
transport.
Many causes have influenced the nations of the world to
limit the transit and landing rights of international airlines, to
restrict freedom of the air. A prime motivation was that of
national security in a military sense, for it was early realized
that the airplane could be used as an instrument of war; there-
50. OPPENHEIIV, op. cit. supra note 1, §§ 248-254; FBNwIcK, INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW 291-293 (1924); STARKE, Op. cit. supra note 1, at 153-155.
51. OPPENHEIm, op. cit. supra note 1, §§ 172, 188, 203; FENWICK, id.
at 270.
52. 1 HYDE, INTERNATIONAL LAW CHIEFLY AS INTERPRETED AND APPLIED
BY THE UNITED STATES § 187 (1922) ; LIsSITYN, op. cit. supra note 19, at
403-405; Cooper, Air Transport and World Organization, 55 YALE L. J.
1191, 1196-1200 (1946).
53. Air transport as used'herein means scheduled air transport opera-
tions. Under the Chicago Convention, art. 5 grants a privilege to non-
scheduled air services to enter a foreign nation and take on traffic (except-
ing cabotage) subject to the right of that nation to impose conditions or
regulations as it deems desirable.
Washington University Open Scholarship
ECONOMIC REGULATION OF AIR TRANSPORT
fore, each nation desired international law to recognize its
right to close its airspace to aircraft of another nation.54 More-
over, states have sought in every conceivable manner to protect
the secrecy of their military fortifications, and therefore there
entered the element of fear that freedom of the air would
permit future enemies to fly over the country, observe and
photograph military bases and operations. Air transport pilots
of a foreign schedule service quickly learn conditions of ter-
rain and weather of the nation over which they fly. This
experience is readily utilized by the military forces in time of
war 15 The United States was acting for reasons of security
when, prior to World War II, it refused permits to foreign
air transport's flight through Alaska, Hawaii, Midway, Wake
and Guam. Permission to land in Hawaii, sought by the
British and Netherlands airlines companies, was refused be-
cause the United States Government feared the Hawaiian
defenses would be open to view from foreign aircraft. 6
Aside from direct military considerations, an obstacle to free-
dom of the air for commercial services has been the pure and
simple selfish interests of nations. States possessing a fortunate
geographic position, lying within the orbit of the great trade
routes of the world, have been permitted to benefit greatly by
the concept of airspace sovereignty. Since this principle blocks
flight through the airspace of a sovereign nation, it has been
possible for the subjacent state to bargain on its own terms
and to exact onerous concessions before granting any privileges
of landing or transit. For example, Portugal required that Lis-
bon, its capital, be made the first and last port of call in Europe
when the Azores were used in trans-Atlantic service. This was a
stiff price to pay, but for a permit to land at the Azores on
the great north Atlantic route the airlines were forced to ac-
cede.17
The greatest restraining factor to freedom of the air is the
fact that air transport is not and never has been just another
commercial enterprise. The air routes are the scene of political
54. Cooper, supra note 52, at 1192.
55. COLEGROvE, op. cit. supra note 2, at 8; LISSITZYN, op. cit. supra note
19, at 408.
56. LiSSITZYN, id. at 407.
57. Id. at 406; Logic of the Air, Fortune Vol. 27, p. 72, April, 1943, as
compiled in WORTHINGTON, INTERNATIONAL AIRWAYS 35, 39-41 (1945).
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development, and the issue of their control is a primary aim of
national external policy. Air transport and control of the air
routes are a portion of national power-economic and military-
and as such are inseparable from national and international
politics. The drive to foster and develop air transport is a
national incentive inasmuch as this form of transportation is a
vital influence, an element of power contributing to the strength
and wealth of nations. This is true for many and varied rea-
sons. Civil air transport, though often stated to be separate
and distinct, is in reality so closely connected to military avia-
tion as to be considered part and parcel thereof. Commercial
aircraft can be utilized most effectively by military air trans-
port operations as well illustrated by the war-time operations
of the Air Transport Command which were carried on in large
degree by an integration of private airlines companies with that
military organization. 8 Moreover, in peacetime civil air trans-
port calls for the construction of planes and experimentation
with new and different types of aircraft which tend to maintain
and keep alive aircraft factories in interims between wars;
these can quickly be converted to the production of military
aircraft when the need arises. Pilots of private airlines may
always be considered as a reserve peacetime force capable of
taking over in time of war. 9
It is manifestly in the self-interest of states to extend them-
selves to other nations for purposes of trade and commerce by
developing air transport services. Undeniably air transport
occupies a more important position in this respect than other
forms of transportation, for it is able to disregard surface
obstacles, thus making possible the opening up for trade of
many heretofore inaccessible portions of the globe." Too, air
services have contributed not inconsiderably to the task of
binding empires together, and this factor has not been com-
pletely ignored by nations like Britain and France who have
sought to expand their services to all parts of their respective
realms.61 In addition, nations have utilized air transport for
the purposes of spreading political and ideological doctrines as
58. LISSITZYN, id. at 71-74; Burke, Influences Affecting International
Aviation Policy, 11 LAw & CONTmIP. PRoB. 598, 601 (1946).
59. LiSSITZYN, id. at 74-75; COLovE, op. cit. supra note 2, at 8.
60. LissrTzyN, id. at 49-53.
61. Id. at 64-67; COLEmnOVE, op. cit. supra note 2, at 8.
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evidenced by the pre-war air expansion of Germany in South
America and Japan in Asia. 2
Since air transport occupies such an important role in modern
domestic policy, states have felt compelled to promote and
develop airlines systems to operate both nationally and inter-
nationally. It has only been in rare instances that airlines
companies could pay their own way. Revenues have failed to
equal operating costs. Therefore, direct governmental assist-
ance has been required and has been forthcoming in the form
of subsidies by governments. 3 Air transpoit companies have
been subsidized freely by frequent drains on national treasuries.
Freedom of the air as envisaged by the five freedoms agree-
ment would lead to old-fashioned, and apparently today out-
moded, laissez faire competition between the airlines of the
world in order to acquire the air passenger, freight and express
business of the world. Such competition conjures up pictures
of a race for air routes, rate wars and uncontrolled expansion
with possible unequal division of existing traffic. Hence, the
airlines of a country might well go deeper in the red, their
revenues dropping sharply, which in turn would call for ever
increasing governmental subsidy payments to maintain opera-
tions. The result: the services of weaker nations would be
forced to discontinue.
For reasons of national policy outlined above, states are too
interested, have too much at stake in retaining their own air
transport systems to risk a jeopardizing of their position by
placing them in a perilous situation endangered by international
rivalry and competition which might be the consequence of a
grant of the five freedoms." However, freedom of the air
might be conferred if at the same time certain international
economic controls could be adopted in order to protect the eco-
nomic position of a state's international air carriers. Hence,
efforts have been made to conclude agreement along such lines.
IV. PROPOSED INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC CONTROLS
A. The Chicago Conference. The Chicago Conference was
called in order to open up the air and to provide rights for
62. LISSITZYN, id. at 57-59; Cooper, supra note 52, at 1204.
63. On the subject of subsidies to air transport see LISSITZYN, id. at
Chapter 8, 137-220; TOMBS, op. cit. svpra note 2, at 31-35.
64. LissiTzYN, id. at 409-410.
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air transport to travel and to carry international commerce.
Further, and of utmost importance, international economic
collaboration was sought to end or alleviate trade rivalries be-
tween nations over air routes and air transport services. The
Conference had two basic objectives: (1) to draw up a new set
of uniform safety and technical standards on an international
scale to replace the outmoded ones which had been promulgated
years before at the Paris and Havana Conventions and (2) to
determine if and to what extent international air transport
could be regulated by international economic control. 5
If the skies are to be free, then there would seem to be
a definite need for international control of air transport in the
economic sphere, for there is close connection between freedom
of the air and such regulation. It is argued that economic
regulation is an absolute necessity to protect the interests of
nations granting freedom of the air in order to do away with
wasteful competition, rate wars and those monopolistic practices
of the airlines and of the nations themselves which tend to
stifle competition. Therefore, the economic regulation possibly
envisioned would call for the granting of international routes
only in the public convenience and necessity, the regulation of
airline rates and business practices and, further, the control or
prohibition of uneconomic subsidies. Moreover, it has been
contended that on international routes there should be regu-
lation by international agreement providing for number of
schedules, frequencies or capacity to be operated over routes by
air transport operations."
The Conference was notably successful in the promulgation
of new safety and technical standards, but in the economic
sphere agreement could not be reached." During the course of
the Conference three varied plans were presented by the United
States, Australia and New Zealand, and Britain and Canada
relative to the economic control of world air transport.
The United States took its stand and called for an opening
of the skyways to world air transport which would signify
freedom of operations, equality of opportunity and competition
65. Van Zandt, The Chicago Conference, Foreign Policy Reports, Vol.
20, p. 290, Feb. 15, 1945 as compiled in WORTHINGTON, op. cit. supra note 57.
66. Berle, supra note 27, at 6-7.
67. Leiding, Technical Fields, Air Transport, Vol. 2, p. 87 as compiled in
WORTHINGTON, Op. cit. supra note 57; Morgan, supra note 28, at 11-12.
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in the air. 8 This country opposed, for the most part, any
international regulatory controls of an economic nature. The
American delegates stood for free enterprise, free competition.
This position is somewhat anomalous when one considers that
the United States by the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938 and
through the Civil Aeronautics Board has drastically regulated
its own airlines companies economically, and has curbed com-
petition by an allotment of air routes to certain specified car-
riers only, and further, has subjected air rates and business
practices of the airlines to administrative control.69 Never-
theless, in the international regulatory field the United States
petitioned for a policy of hands off, laissez faire. In desiring
freedom of the air, the United States was propelled by
motives both selfish and idealistic. Selfishly, the United
States was undeniably possessed of leadership in the air with
the most highly developed aircraft and air transport industries.
Therefore, the United States delegates believed that the United
States could more than hold its own in any competitive race.
The opening of the skyways would permit American air trans-
port companies freedom to increase their operations without
hindrance and further strengthen American air transport.
Idealistically, the belief was present that the air transport of all
countries would reap an advantage through competition, and
that it was much too early to allocate routes to certain nations
and limit schedules to be flown on routes, since with respect
to the former some nations were not yet prepared to enter air
transport, though they might so desire later; and as to the
latter such limitation of frequencies was thought not feasible
because world air transport stood on the threshold of great
68. Berle, supra note 27, at 1:
The Government of the United States has taken and maintained the
view that:
Worldwide development of civil aviation is a powerful force for world
unity and world peace;
A general system of rights for planes to travel and to carry interna-
tional commerce should be set up, becoming the established custom of
commerce by air, as similar arrangements have become the settled law
of commerce by sea;
These rights of transit and commerce should be available to all na-
tions, permitting equal opportunity and reasonable competition; and
All nations should join in a world organization designed both to pre-
vent competitive excesses and exploitation, and to maintain technical
facilities and standards.
69. See Burden, supra note 28, at 19.
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expansion which could not be accurately prognosticated and
limitations might hinder more than aid.70 The United States
delegation was apparently ready to accept some control by an
international air regulatory body which might be empowered
to intervene in case of dispute and certain cases of dangerous
and unfair competition such as rate wars and unfair practices.,'
Australia and New Zealand announced a novel and exciting
plan calling for the establishing of a single international cor-
poration or authority to own and operate all international air
transport. Only local domestic airlines could be operated by
a single nation or the private airlines of such nation. In other
words the plan visualized a complete elimination of competition
on the air routes which would mean an elimination of com-
petitive rivalries of nations in the air, and thus remove evil
conditions, possibly war, to which such national struggles lead.
Such a plan would end contention between nations in at least
one field of endeavor-civil aviation. The nations were not yet
ready to pool their interests, to accommodate each other, or
to limit to this extent the exercise of state sovereignty, and
until such occurs the plan must fail. 2
Britain and Canada stressed the need for order in the air
and advocated an international Civil Aeronautics Board with
economic powers over routes, fares, frequencies and capacity
allowable of air transport operations. They feared that with-
out economic control international air services would be oper-
ated for purposes of national prestige even though planes flew
almost empty. Therefore, rate and subsidy wars would result.
They desired to assure to each nation by economic regulation a
fair share of the traffic. Probably they were haunted by an
abiding fear that without control the United States with its
superiority in the air and its near monopoly of suitable air
transport aircraft would dominate the field. The United King-
dom proposed that the International Commission be empowered
to grant or refuse operating licenses on international routes on
a basis of public convenience and necessity. It was suggested
70. Air: The U. S. Position, Fortune Vol. ao, p. 1154, Oct., 1944 as com-
piled in WORTHINGTON, op. cit. supra note 57. Berle supra note 27, at 7;
Morgan, supra note, 28, at 11.
71. Berle, id. at 7.
72. Sullivan, Internationl Ownership of Air Transport, Free World, Vol.
8, p. 503, Dec., 1944 as compiled in WORTHINGTON, op cit. supra note 57;
Berle, id. at 5-6.
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that this body should possibly determine the number of flights
or schedules or capacity that the airlines of the various countries
might operate on given international routes, and it was also ad-
vocated that there should be a regulation of fares charged by
international air transport companies.73
A propos operating rights on international routes, the debate
narrowed during the course of the Conference. There was a
semblance of support for a universal authorization of interna-
tional routes as proclaimed by the five freedoms agreement.
The real obstacle to agreement was a dispute over whether
there should be a limitation on capacity that could be operated
by the air carriers of each nation over each route.7 4 The United
Kingdom apparently wished to limit capacity by reference to
the jurisdiction of an international body with power to deter-
mine what capacity would be allowed over a route. The United
States would not agree to control by an international commis-
sion, but did indicate possible willingness to agree to some
manner of automatic formula which a commission could apply.
An advocated formula was one based on the idea that an airline
could fly more trips only by showing that for a considerable
time more than two-thirds of its total capacity had been occu-
pied by a revenue paying commercial load.75 However, the
United States refused to give any further consideration to
such a proposal when the British rejected the fifth-freedom
as set out in the Air Transport Agreement; that is, Britain
asserted that only the traffic carried direct from the airline's
home country should "count in establishing the initial fre-
quency of service and in increasing the frequency."7 6  The
traffic picked up en route should not be counted. The United
73. Berle, id. at 6; Morgan, supra note 28, at 10; Burden, supra note
28 at 19. A British plan for a new convention proposed that the interna-
tional air routes should be defined; that uneconomic competition should be
eliminated by the determination and distribution of frequencies between
countries concerned as well as the fixing of rates; that international air
operators should be licensed; and that facilities be denied unlicensed opera-
tors. See OPPENHEIM, op. cit. supra note 1, at 480, n. 6.
74. Warner, supra note 28, at 28 and 32.
75. Canada put forward a compromise plan which would have granted
the first four freedoms and also would have placed the control of airline
frequencies in the hands of an international commission. A formula for
frequencies was outlined. See OPPENHEIm, op. cit. supra note 1, at 479-480,
n. 6; see also Morgan supra note 28, at 12; Burden, supra note 28, at 20;
Warner, supra note 28, at 30.
76. Burden, id. at 20.
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States was basically opposed to restrictions on intermediate
traffic (fifth-freedom traffic)." It believed such traffic to be
necessary for the economic operation of long distance through
airlines. On the other hand countries possessing mainly local
international airlines feared that unless some obstacle were
placed in the way of through air carriers to carry fifth-freedom
traffic, that such local or regional airlines would be unable
to compete with through airlines and thus would be unable to
survive."
With such fundamental disagreement over possible economic
controls further insistence was futile. Therefore, regulation
of air transport routes, frequencies or operating capacity was
omitted from the Convention. This was also true as to rate
regulation, since the United States was opposed to placing
rate control in the hands of an international commission.
Therefore, the Air Transit Agreement and the Air Transport
Agreement were submitted separately in order to provide as
much freedom of the air as possible."9
The Chicago Convention specifically permits pooling arrange-
ments and joint operating organizations. Articles 77 and 79
declare:
Nothing in this Convention shall prevent two or more
contracting States from constituting joint air transport
organizations and from pooling their air services on any
routes or in any regions.
A State may participate in joint operating organizations
or in pooling arrangements, either through its govern-
ment or through an airline company or companies desig-
nated by its government. The companies may, at the sole
discretion of the State concerned, be state-owned or partly
state-owned or privately owned.
Close combinations between carriers of two or more coun-
tries which lead to consolidations of economic power and the
elimination of the advantages of competition are authorized,
even encouraged, though provision is made for registration of
such agreements with the Council of the International Civil
Aviation Organization." This is a distinct improvement over
77. Ibid.
78. Ryan, Policy Issues in Inte ational Air Transportation, 16 GEo..
WASH. L. REV. 443, 457 (1948)..
79. Burden, supra note 28, at 21.
80. Chicago Convention, supra note 12, art. 77.
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the past practice of not making them public. These arrange-
ments in the past were often made by two or more airlines
companies to operate a common line whereby the number of
flights which each company could make would be regulated
and provision would be made for joint and mutual administra-
tive and technical staffs and publicity arrangements. The rev-
enues of both companies would be pooled and divided propor-
tionately. These agreements were common in Europe prior
to World War II and there is an increasing trend in this
direction at present." Great Britain, Australia and New Zealand
operate British Commonwealth Pacific Airlines jointly across
the Pacific. A combined operating company has been formed
by Norway, Sweden and Denmark, the Scandinavian Airlines
System, to operate the trans-Atlantic route to the United
States and South America.
This type of organization does away with competition be-
tween the carriers of those nations forming the one joint
operating company and places the resultant carrier in a stronger
competitive position, thus affecting the other carriers conduct-
ing air traisport operations over the same route. It must be
borne in mind that a further possible danger might arise in
that if countries A, B and C pool their services in one carrier
such countries might then prevent the carriage of traffic
moving between countries A, B and C by the carrier or carriers
of any other state." Pooling arrangements and joint operating
agreements are justifiable in the public interest. This might
be true where a route traversed is a thinly populated one
generating little traffic, but if competitive conditions are thought
to be at all desirable, the consequences of such combinations
should be considered. To date little discussion has been ac-
corded this subject at international gatherings.
The Chicago Convention did create the International Civil
Aviation Organization known as ICAO.8 3 This body is com-
posed of an assembly with representatives of each member state
and a Council which is elected by the Assembly. An interim
81. TOMBS, op. cit. supra note 2, at 35-41; LISSITZYN, op. cit. supra note
19, at 395-396.
82. Ryan, supra note 78, at 465-468.
83. Chapters VII, VIII, and IX of the Convention on International Civil
Aviation, supra note 12. See Colclaser, The New International Civil Avia-
tion Organization, 31 VA. L. Ray. 457 (1945).
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Agreement also was drawn up at Chicago which was to be
effective until the Convention came into being. By this Interim
Agreement a Provisional Civil Aviation Organization (PICAO)
was set up which functioned for a time. 4 Both PICAO and
ICAO were authorized to take those necessary measures for
unification of technical and safety procedures. However, in
the economic field only powers of an advisory and administra-
tive nature were granted. No power was given to the organiza-
tions to allocate routes, control frequencies or capacity of inter-
national airlines, fix rates or regulate competitive practices.
PICAO and later ICAO were charged by the Convention to
study those problems which affect international air transport.
Recognizing that the problem of economic controls and the
exchange of operating rights in international air transport were
closely related, the Air Transport Committee of PICAO pre-
pared a draft multilateral convention on the exchange of such
commercial rights and embodying economic principles. This
draft was presented to the permanent Assembly of ICAO for
consideration. 5 The draft, insofar as economic controls are
concerned, contained provisions regarding freedom of the air
and air transport operations and routes, capacity, rates, subsi-
dies and disagreements.
B. ,Multilateral Agreement on Commercial Rights in Interna-
tional Civil Air Transport-Proceedings of the Committee on
Air Transport.
1. Freedom of the Air. The preamble of this proposed agree-
ment set forth a new phrase in the field of international air
transport, "regulated freedom of the air." A "regulated free-
dom of the air" was called for as the only means by which
the development of international air transport could be secured
84. Interim Agreement on International Civil Aviation, Appendix I to
the International Civil Aviation Conference supra note 12. The provisional
organization became defunct in 1947 when the permanent organization ICAO
came into being.
85. Multilateral Agreement on Commercial Rights in International Civil
Air Transport-Proceedings of the Committee on Air Transport (Submitted
through the Interim Council) to the First Assembly of the International
Civil Aviation Organization. PICAO Docket 2866 AT/169, 26/2/47. This
draft is set out in 14 J. Am L. 235 (1947). For an excellent discussion on
this proposed agreement see Cooper, The Proposed Multilateral Agreement
on Commercial Rights in International Civil Air Transport, 14 . Am L.
125 (1947).
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in accordance with the aims of the Convention. The Agree-
ment evisaged apparently, and this is borne out by later chapters
of the draft, a situation wherein scheduled world carriers would
be permitted to travel to any country and trade therein sub-
ject to economic regulation. The wording was seemingly an
assault on the old citadel of airspace sovereignty. The terms
"freedom of the air" and "airspace sovereignty" do not jibe,
for if there is freedom of the air as a right, then there is no
sovereignty and vice versa. To base the Convention on freedom
of the air, even though regulated, nullifies the doctrine of
sovereignty of the air as set out in all Conventions beginning
with that at Paris and ending with that at Chicago. If such
was not the intention, the language should have been more care-
fully drafted recognizing that the transit of aircraft through a
nation's airspace is not a right but only a privilege."
Chapter H was concerned with air transport operations and
routes. It was stated in Article 6:
Subject to the provisions of this agreement, each con-
tracting state shall have the right that its duly authorized
airlines shall be entitled to fly their aircraft across the
territory of any other contracting state without landing and
to make in such territory, stops for non-traffic purposes
and for the purpose of putting down and taking on
passengers, mail and cargo.
Further provisions of Chapter II required each contracting
state to designate a reasonable number of airports to be used
as international airports87 Contracting states would be pro-
hibited from denying the use of its airports in respect of stops
for non-traffic purposes to any international airline of a con-
tracting state if such airports were open to use by its own
international air services."
Chapter II, as can be seen, was a multilateral grant of the
five freedoms of the air stated in simplified language as pro-
mulgated by the Air Transport Agreement. Included within
Article 6 is the privilege to fly across the territory of a state
without landing (first freedom) ; the privilege to land for non-
traffic purposes (second freedom); the privilege to put down
traffic taken on in the territory of the state whose nationality
86. Cooper id. at 129-134, criticizes this wording.
87. Multilateral Agreement, supra note 85, art. 7 (a).
88. Id., art. 7(c).
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the aircraft possesses (third freedom); the privilege to take on
passengers, mail and cargo destined for the territory of the
state whose nationality the aircraft possesses (fourth freedom);
and the privilege to take on passengers, mail and cargo destined
for the territory of any other contracting state and the privilege
to put down passengers, mail and cargo coming from any such
territory (fifth freedom). This provision would do away com-
pletely with bilateral bargaining over international routes. The
right to fly thus conferred would not be confined to particular
routes but a general right available to any airline duly author-
ized by its own government. 9
This proposed multilateral agreement is broader than the
Air Transport Agreement, for by the terms of that agreement
relating to the third, fourth and fifth freedoms the rights of
transit and trade pertained only to an undertaking operating
"through services on a route constituting a reasonably direct
line out from and back to the homeland of the State whose
nationality the aircraft possesses.c? In addition under the
latter agreement each state was permitted to "designate the
route to be followed within its territory by an international
air service and the airports which any such service may use." 1
Under the proposed draft state A, a contracting state, would
be forced to permit the authorized scheduled air transport serv-
ices of other contracting states to fly through the airspace of
state A; to land for non-traffic purposes at any airport in state
A, provided the airport was used by A's international air serv-
ices and provided further that the airport's physical accommo-
dation and traffic capacity would permit. Thus state A would
be almost powerless to designate routes for international air
transit.
The minority of the Air Transport Committee opposed a grant
of general rights to fly and trade by multilateral agreement. 92
They desired a system of "regulated bilateralism," that is, route
arrangements should be the subject of negotiation between two
states, and a multilateral agreement should only set forth prin-
ciples for contracting states to follow in the exchange and
89. Commentary on Chapter Il-Appendix B, 14 J. AiR L. 235, 247
(1947).
90. Multilateral Agreement, supra note 85, art. 1, see. 1.
91. Id., art. 1, see. 5 (1).
92. Appendix C. Statement of Minority Views, supra note 89.
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operation of routes bilaterally. The minority of opinion was
prevalent inasmuch as it was realistically believed that states
would not enter into a multilateral agreement exchanging five
freedom rights with all airlines of every cdntracting state. It
was said:
: I . countries . . . have the problem of protecting their
international airlines from an undue number of other inter-
national airlines seeking business over the same routes into
the homeland. The easiest way for any country to limit
the amount of competition on the routes entering its terri-
tory is obviously to limit the number of other countries
with which it will exchange rights for any particular con-
necting route. 3
2. Capacity. Chapter III of the proposed multilateral draft
dealt with the amount of capacity914 which international carriers
would be permitted to offer over a route, that is, the number of
passenger seats and the amount of mail and cargo space the
carrier would be permitted to fly on its international route. A
proposed limitation on capacity was offered to prevent destruc-
tive competition for otherwise there arose the possibility of near
empty aircraft flying the world air routes. A capacity restric-
tion would prevent excessive capacity offerings. Too, such
limitation would remove the necessity for designating routes
or "to fix the route pattern in terms of reasonably direct routes
out from and back to the territory of the state in question, for
the traffic flow itself should normally eliminate unnecessary
meanderings."'
Article 10 (a) set forth regulatory provisions dealing with the
amount of capacity as follows:
The amount of capacity which a contracting State shall be
entitled to permit any of its airlines to provide from time
to time over various stages of each route shall be that
required for the carriage, at a reasonable load factor, of
both:
93. Multilateral Agreement on Commercial Rights in International Civil
Air Transport: Statement by the Delegate of the U. S., Mr. Paul T. David,
made at the Air Transport Committee Meeting held Feb. 10, 1947. PICAO
Docket 2766 - AT/165.
94. Capacity has been defined as: " ... the total capacity to transport
commercial load over a given route in some convenient unit of time. It
may be expressed, for example, as the product of the number of schedules
operated per week multiplied by the average commercial carrying capacity
of one of the aircraft of the type used." Warner, supra note 28, at 28.
95. Commentary on Chapter III -Capacity, supra note 89, at 248.
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(i) passengers, mail and cargo taken on or to be put
down by such airline in the territory of such state;
and
(ii) passengers, mail and cargo moving by such airline
between points in the territories of other States
which the route touches, insofar as capacity for
such traffic is not being provided by airlines of the
States in which the traffic is takeni on or put down.
Thus according to Article 10(a) there were two factors upon
which capacity allowable was to be based: 10 (a) (i), third and
fourth-freedom traffic, and 10 (a) (ii), fifth-freedom traffic. With
reference to third and fourth-freedom traffic this simply meant
that an airline of state A could carry traffic taken on in 'state
A to state B and disembark this traffic there, and further take
on traffic in state B for return to state A subject to a capacity
allowable on the route measured by a reasonable load factor.
Third and fourth-freedom traffic was recognized as a funda-
mental element. In the Commentary to the proposed agree-
ment, it was said:
* . . the right to provide the capacity required for one's
own traffic is . . . inherent and not subject to reduction
as long as the load factor is reasonable. 6
Free competition was envisaged by Article 10(a) (i) as to
third and fourth-freedom traffic. Consider the situation of two
nations, A and B, each possessed of an international airline
operating to the other. These two airlines would be permitted
to compete for the traffic, passenger, mail and cargo, moving
between A and B. If the airline of A obtained a larger amount
of traffic than that of B, then, as the load condition changed,
the amount of capacity that could be carried by each airline
would be recalculated at some future time to meet a reasonable
load factor, with the result that if the airline of A captured a
larger share of the business through offering better service it
could offer more capacity. The airline of B as a consequence
would lose traffic possibly to a point where its load factor
would no longer be reasonable and would be forced to reduce
capacity offered. It would be conceivable that the airline of B
might be forced to discontinue operations in such case. Under
Article 11(a) a state could permit its airlines reasonable discre-
tion as regards the amount of capacity offered on the establish-
96. Ibid
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ment of a new international service. Therefore, upon beginning
a new service on a route the airline could operate to the capacity
that its government believed reasonable. However, if this new
service were competing with other established airlines on the
route, it would be compelled to obtain sufficient traffic by some
date in the future to bring its load factor up to the norm of
the route concerned. Otherwise the amount of capacity it
could carry would be reduced to an amount conforming to the
amount of traffic it was capable of carrying at the route load
factor.
As opposed to the competition permitted with respect to third
and fourth-freedom traffic, it was severely restricted in the
case of fifth-freedom traffic. The fifth-freedom privilege
permits the taking on and putting down of international traffic
by a trunk line operating along a route passing through several
nations. Article 10(a) (ii) would allow the capacity offering
of traffic moving between points in the territories of other
states which the route touched to be measured by a reason-
able load factor insofar as capacity for such traffic was not
being provided by airlines of the states in which such traffic
was taken on or put down.
This has been said to signify the following:
On all routes from country A to countries B, C, and D,
airlines of country A can put on all the traffic desired to
carry available traffic at a reasonable load factor. If any
substantial amount of the traffic is disembarked at B, then
B is a point at which capacity must be recalculated. No air-
craft of A can be operated beyond B except at a load factor
based on the through traffic from A to C and beyond if
local services of countries B or C provide capacity for traffic
beyond B. In such case, the only fifth freedom traffic
which an airline of A could pick up at B would be the
amount which would fill up the seats still available after
the new capacity is determined."
It can readily be seen that such a scheme would impose
drastic limitations on trunk lines in order to protect local
international airlines, that is, in the example set forth above
such would protect the local airlines of B operating to C and-
those of C operating to B from the through services of the
airline of A. Such an arrangement would do injury to inter-
97. Cooper supra note 85, at 141-142.
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national trunk lines by curtailing in large degree the amount
of intermediate traffic which they could carry. Fifth-freedom
traffic would be limited seriously. Thus, at the Chicago Con-
ference the United States refused to accept an agreement cur-
tailing such traffic for such was thought to be essential to the
economic operations of long distance routes. Curtailment of
this traffic could well have disastrous results to airlines of
such nations as Great Britain, the United States, the Nether-
lands and France, who operate routes to far distant portions of
the globe. The framers, however, of this proposed agreement be-
lieved that fifth-freedom traffic was not fundamental. They
stated:
: * . the right to provide capacity for this purpose is not
inherent but exists only so long as the airlines of the other
States concerned cannot accommodate such traffic. 8
3. Rates-Subsidies-Disagreements. Article 14 was a very
broad and general rate provision to the effect that each con-
tracting state should require its airlines to charge reasonable
rates. The setting of these rates could be done by the airlines
or by the states. Such a broad provision based merely on
reasonability can be criticized, for a rate might be reasonable
to one country under its cost conditions but unreasonable to
another. It was provided that in case of rate disagreement an
arbitral tribunal should decide the question, but such tribunal
would find it difficult to come to a decision as to the reason-
ability without guides to follow in so determining.
Article 15 related to subsidies though the term was not men-
tioned. It provided:
Each contracting State shall refrain from granting to any
airlines any form of assistance which fosters competitive
practices destructive to other airlines.
No definition was given to the phrase "competitive practices
98. Commentary on Chapter III, supra note 89, at 248. See this Com-
mentary for full discussion of these capacity provisions and also Cooper,
supra note 85, at 139-146. A previous draft multilateral agreement sub-
mitted to the First Interim Assembly of PICAO in 1946 proposed to pro-
tect local international airlines against competing trunk lines by permitting
nations to require the through airlines of other nations to charge higher
fares on through routes competing with local regional lines. This was re-
rejected. Discussion on the Development of a Multilateral Agreement on
Commercial Rights in International Civil Air Transport, PICAO Docket
2089-EC/57 Oct., 1946. See in this respect Ryan, supra note 78, at 458 and
Little, Control of International Air Transport, 3 INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZA-
TION 29, 34 (1949).
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destructive to other airlines"; however, it would seem that a
practice of granting a subsidy to an airline resulting in great
loss of business by a competitive airline might be considered a
destructive practice within the purview of the provision and
which the arbitral tribunal could order discontinued.
Article 16 stated:
Each contracting State shall prevent its airlines from en-
gaging in unfair competitive practices and from participat-
ing in any arrangements which result in defeating the aims
of this agreement.
Although once again unfair competitive practices and arrange-
ments were undefined, this provision, it is submitted, aimed at
those monopolistic practices and close combinations of the air-
lines companies themselves which would tend to do away with
the regulated freedom of the air incorporated into the proposed
draft.
In the event of disagreement it was provided that when
disputes arose over the interpretation or application of the
agreement, such disputes were to be resolved by an arbitral
tribunal."" Conformity to the decisions of this tribunal was
necessary, for in the event of nonconformity the other con-
tracting states were to refuse to permit operations of the air-
line through their superjacent airspace. 00
In summary, this proposed agreement provided for a general
exchange of transit privileges inclusive of all five freedoms of
the air. It limited capacity with respect to third and fourth-
freedom traffic only to a reasonable load factor, but capacity
as concerned in fifth-freedom traffic was further restricted, for
in computing the reasonable load factor it would have been neces-
sary to consider capacity as provided by airlines of other states
in which traffic was taken on or put down. The agreement
called for reasonable rates and sought to prohibit destructive
competitive practices by states and by the airlines. Arbitral
machinery was set up to settle disputes arising from these
economic provisions in case negotiations failed between the
disputing parties.
General agreement could not be reached by the Assembly
of ICAO upon the provisions of this proposed aggreement on
99. Multilateral Agreement, supra note 85, art. 17 (a).
100. Id., art. 17 (c).
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commercial rights in international civil air transport; there-
fore, it was never submitted for ratification as a treaty. In
the main there was disagreement as to whether an automatic
exchange of routes should be included or whether the right to
exchange routes by bilateral negotiations should be reserved.
Also, the fifth-freedom capacity restriction was thought by
many to be unduly prejudicial to the economic operation of
long distance trunk lines. However, the Assembly did realize
a need for a multilateral treaty dealing with exchange of routes
and economic problems. Hence, a commission of all member
states was called at Geneva in 1947 to develop and submit for
consideration of member states an agreement with regard to
the exchange of commercial rights in civil air transport. Here
again the problems of route exchange, capacity, rates and
unfair practices were considered. Once again there was failure
to reach an agreement to be submitted to member states
although a draft was drawn and incorporated in the final report
of the conference which is here set forth for discussion."'
C. Multilateral Agreement on Commercial Rights in Inter-
national Civil Air Transport-Final Report of ICAO Com-
mission.
1. Routes and Arrangements for Operation of International
Air Services. In drafting this proposed agreement at Geneva
the exponents of regulated bilateralism triumphed. A minority
believed as formerly that a multilateral agreement should elim-
inate making of bilateral agreements but the completed draft
incorporated the view that a multilateral agreement should
not " . . . convey the right to operate air services over the
territory of another State....,,02
Article 8 stated:
The privilege granted to a contracting State of taking on
and putting down international air traffic in the territory
of another contracting State under the provisions of the
present Agreement shall be granted only by a separate
101. Multilateral Agreement on Commercial Rights in International Civil
Air Transport - Final Report of ICAO Commission (Geneva Conference,
Nov. 4-27, 1947). The draft agreement is set out in Annex III and incor-
porated in 15 J. Am L. 92-105 (1948). For discussion see McClurkin, The
Geneva Commission on a Multilateral Air Transport Agreement, 15 J. AIR
L. 39 (1948).102. Multilateral Agreement Geneva, 15 J. AiR L. 92, 94 (1948).
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arrangement (hereinafter called a Route Agreement) be-
tween such contracting States. No contracting State shall
be required to enter into a Route Agreement.
By this provision all exchanges of routes between nations
would be left to bilateral agreement. Obligations were not
imposed upon a nation to grant routes to any other nation.
It was contended that the multilateral agreement should
grant the third, fourth and fifth-freedoms, but ". .. that
authority to operate over specific routes should be subject to
separate bilateral negotiation, without obligation to grant any
such authorization."'"° In other words a route authorization
did not have to be granted, but, if it were granted, it must
permit the privilege of the five freedoms of the air. Once
agafn those nations wishing to protect local international serv-
ices defeated any inclusion of such a provision. They specifically
objected when the draft was drawn to include no limitation
on capacity allowable with respect to fifth-freedom traffic other
than a reasonable load factor. Therefore, there was inserted
Article 9 which reads as follows:
Nothing in the present Agreement shall prevent a con-
tracting State from entering into a Route Agreement which
will grant to another contracting State only the privilege
of taking on and putting down international air traffic
originating in or destined for the territory of the other
party to the Route Agreement, and not the privilege of
carrying international air traffic both originating in and
destined for points on the agreed routes in the territories
of States other than the parties to the Route Agreement.
This permits a nation to enter into a bilateral agreement with
another, granting third and fourth-freedom rights only, omit-
ting to grant the fifth-freedom. Those nations possessing long
distance route operations were in the minority and could not
persuade the majority of the validity of their viewpoint that
local operations would be protected since each nation would have
the privilege to grant routes. This should assure sufficient
protection to local services. On the other hand the minority
believed that evil results would follow by inserting a definite
provision allowing nations to eliminate fifth-freedom traffic
from their agreements since operations of trunk lines would
be deprived of economic operation by fifth-freedom restriction.
103. Id. at 93.
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As stated, the minority desired to include a definite provision
to the effect that if 'a bilateral agreement were made it.must
embrace fifth-freedom traffic. These incompatible views as to
fifth-freedom traffic once again prevented general agreement.
2. Capacity. Article 15 dealt with the capacity that could be
offered. It provided:
(a) The capacity provided by the designated air lines of a
party to a Route Agreement, together with the capacity
provided by the designated air lines of the other party,
shall be maintained in reasonable relationship to the re-
quirements of the public for air transportation on the
agreed routes.
(b) In the application of the principle stated in paragraph
(a) above,
(i) the air services provided by ,a designated air line
under a Route Agreement shall have as their primary
objective the provision at a reasonable load factor,
of capacity adequate to the current and reasonably
anticipated requirements of that air line for the car-
riage of international air traffic originating in or
destined for the territory of the party designating
the air line;
(ii) the capacity provided under sub-paragraph (i) may
be augmented by complementary capacity adequate
for the carriage of international air traffic both
originating at and destined for points on the agreed
routes in the territories of States other than that
designating the air line. Such additional comple-
mentary capacity shall be related to the traffic re-
quirements of the areas through which the air line
operates, after taking account of the special posi-
tion of other air services established by air lines
of the States referred to above in so far as they
are carrying, on the whole or part of the agreed
routes, international air traffic originating in or des-
tined for their territories.
This provision would require the maintenance of a total
capacity over a route at a reasonable relationship to the re-
quirements of the public for air transportation at a reasonable
load figure. Here there is no limitation on fifth-freedom traffic
capacity allowable other than a statement that the capacity
offered must bear a reasonable relationship to the requirement
of the public for air service plus a taking into account of
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the special position of local and regional air services so as not
to prejudice them unduly. Thus, no real restriction was placed
upon capacity of fifth-freedom traffic as in the former pro-
posed multilateral agreement. This led to the insertion of
Article 9 by those fighting the battle of local and regional
airlines which permitted a state to contract out fifth-freedom
by bilateral agreement.
The term capacity was defined by Article 17 to mean:
. . . pay load expressed in metric tons-kilometers offered
on the route concerned during a specified period of time.
3. Rates-Proubited Practices-Settlement of Disputes. It
was provided that rates to be charged should be fixed at a
reasonable level. However, as opposed to the former proposed
draft certain guides were promulgated. It was stated:
Due regard shall be paid to all relevant factors including
costs of operation, reasonable profit and the rates charged
by other airlines on any part of the route."'
Rates were to be agreed upon, if possible, by the airlines through
resolutions adopted by an organization representative of the
airlines. If such organization were not available, rates should
be fixed between the airlines of contracting states operating
on a route.'' A procedure was adopted for prompt consulta-
tion among governments, or prompt submission to adjudication
where there was disagreement over rates in order to do away
with cases of long delay in introduction of a rate. Provision
was made for the establishment of initial rates for new
services. If a contracting state did not believe existing rates
were fixed at reasonable levels, such state could call for con-
sultation among the governments and also for adjudication if
necessary. 6
This draft made no mention of state assistance to airlines
as being an unfair competitive practice. A simple provision
was inserted that a contracting state should refrain from
engaging in unfair or deceptive practices affecting competition
and should prevent its airlines from so doing.'0 Apparently
unfair competitive practices could have been construed in a
104. Multilateral Agreement Geneva, supra note 101, art. 18 (a).
105. Id., art. 18 (b).
106. Id., art. 18 (c) (d) (e) (f) (g).
107. Id., art. 19.
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proper case to include subsidies by a state to its international
airlines.
Disputes were to be settled if possible by the nations through
negotiation. However, if negotiation should fail the dispute
could be submitted to the International Court of Justice or, in
the alternative, to an arbitral tribunal.'
To make a summation, this draft recognized the principle
of bilateral bargaining by nations regarding the exchange
of routes and operating services. A definite provision was
inserted permitting nations so bargaining to contract out of
such bilateral agreement the fifth-freedom privilege. How-
ever, where routes were granted, then capacity restrictions at
a reasonable load factor based on both third and fourth-free-
dom traffic as well as fifth-freedom traffic were required. More-
over, a regulation of rates was called for and unfair practices
were enjoined. Elaborate settlement of dispute provisions
were inserted. Accord by the Commission, as stated, could
not be reached. Thus the draft agreement was never presented
as a multilateral treaty.
The bte noire of this proposed agreement, as formerly, was
the dispute over fifth-freedom traffic and whether or not
restrictions should be placed thereon. There now seems to be
general agreement that third and fourth-freedom traffic should
not be limited other than possibly by a reasonable load factor;
that each country has a right to as much traffic as it generates.
On the other hand the opinion is prevalent that a broad grant
to fifth-freedom operations would be disastrous to local and
regional services. The opponents of this line of thought feel
just as strongly that to restrict fifth-freedom traffic would
cause uneconomic operation of trunk lines. Consequently, agree-
ment is blocked1c
Thus all exchange of routes between nations and economic
controls, if any, must be provided through the medium of
bilateral agreement without benefit of a multilateral treaty lay-
ing down principles relating to exchange of routes and economic
regulations to be observed by all contracting states. The net
result is that there are no uniform international economic
regulations.
108. Id., art. 21.
109. Ryan, supra note 78, at 457-459; Little, supra note 98, at 36.
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